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Significant Steps or Empty Rhetoric?
Current Efforts by the United States to Combat
Sexual Trafficking near Military Bases
Brian Parsons*
I. INTRODUCTION
“The policy of the United States is to attack vigorously the worldwide
problem of trafficking in persons, using law enforcement efforts,
diplomacy, and all other appropriate tools.”
– National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-22) dated December 16,
2002
“It is the policy of the Department of Defense that trafficking in persons
will not be facilitated in any way by the activities of our Service members,
civilian employees, indirect hires, or DoD contract personnel.”
– Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz Memorandum dated
January 30, 2004
“No leader in this department should turn a blind eye to this issue.”
– Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld Memorandum dated September
16, 2004
¶1

Trafficking in persons has emerged as one of the most serious problems facing the
world today. Somewhere between 600,000 and 800,000 people are trafficked each year
across international borders. 1 Most of the people trafficked are women and children and
these numbers do not reflect the millions of people who are trafficked within their own
countries. 2 Sex trafficking often takes hold in poverty-stricken countries where there are
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few opportunities for women to advance coupled with inadequate laws to prosecute
traffickers. 3
Historically, many of the victims of sex trafficking include women who are forced
to work as prostitutes in areas surrounding military bases. 4 Areas near U.S. military
bases are no exception, as brothels and massage parlors spring up to meet demand. In
fact, the United States has consistently allowed and, in some cases, even implicitly
encouraged the development of brothels near military bases to satisfy the sexual desires
of Americans serving there. 5 Recently, as the list of offenses alleged to have been
committed at Abu Ghraib seemingly increases by the day, new reports indicate a possible
prostitution ring involving members of military police units having sex with Iraqi
prostitutes. 6 These incidents undermine and contradict efforts of the United States to lead
the world in the fight against human trafficking.
In addition, creating a demand for trafficked women in the areas surrounding U.S.
military bases may be making the jobs of servicemen more difficult. Trafficking in
persons is currently the third most profitable form of trafficking worldwide, accounting
for 9.5 billion U.S. dollars of annual revenue for organized crime each year. 7 When U.S.
forces are stationed abroad, one of their primary purposes is to combat organized crime
and help enforce the rule of law. However, the money spent on prostitutes by servicemen
near U.S. military bases often ends up in the hands of the criminals who are responsible
for sexual trafficking. 8 By spending money on prostitutes, the servicemen are helping to
finance the criminal elements they are supposed to be stopping. In fact, these activities
may actually be creating a new market for trafficked women and providing a more fertile
ground for criminal activity. These actions frustrate the very purpose of a military
presence and in the end may do more harm than good.
In essence, sex trafficking near military bases boils down to a supply and demand
issue. While initiatives such as the United Nations Protocol on Trafficking in Persons
and the Trafficking Victims Prevention Act9 may be useful in persuading countries to
combat trafficking within their own borders, the host country alone has the power to
influence the supply of trafficked women available near military bases. But no matter
how hard a country attempts to limit the influx of trafficked women into their country, as
long as U.S. military bases are creating a strong demand for prostitution and trafficked
women, organized crime will find a way to meet that demand. This is not a unique
problem of the United States and its military. As long as there have been armies and
wars, there have been prostitutes near military bases to service the sexual demands of

3

Susan Tiefenbrun, The Saga of Susannah A U.S. Remedy for Sex Trafficking in Women: The Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 107, 111 (2002).
4
Isabelle Talleyrand, Comment, Military Prostitution: How the Authorities Worldwide Aid and Abet
International Trafficking in Women, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT ’L L. & COM. 151, 152 (2000).
5
Id. at 154-56; Emily Nyen Chang, Comment, Engagement Abroad: Enlisted Men, U.S. Military Policy
and the Sex Industry 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 621 (2001).
6
Greg Miller, Alcohol Cited as Problem at Prison; Officials at Abu Ghraib tried to rein in the illicit
behavior before abuse of inmates surfaced, L.A. TIMES, June 13, 2004, at A1.
7
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT , supra note 1, at 13-14.
8
Id.; Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 136.
9
These will be discussed infra Part II.
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soldiers. 10 But, while the United States pledges to combat trafficking worldwide, these
actions threaten the credibility of the United States and help to fund organized crime. 11
In recent years, the United States has taken steps on the international stage to
combat sexual trafficking. In his address to the United Nations General Assembly in
2003, President Bush called human trafficking “a special evil in the abuse and
exploitation of the most innocent and vulnerable.”12 More recently, the United States cosponsored a new “zero-tolerance” policy towards trafficking activities that was adopted
by the twenty-six allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and twenty
additional states in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). 13 However, the
activities of the U.S. military and civilian contractors near U.S. military bases that
contribute to the problem of trafficking make overall U.S. efforts in this area seem
somewhat hypocritical.
To deal with this problem, on December 16, 2002, President Bush issued a national
security presidential directive establishing a zero-tolerance policy towards United States
involvement in trafficking activities abroad. 14 On January 30, 2004, Deputy Defense
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz issued a memo outlining the zero-tolerance policy for the
Department of Defense. 15 Additionally, on September 16, 2004, Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld issued a memo to augment the memo of Deputy Defense Secretary
Wolfowitz, stating his commitment to taking “every step possible to combat Trafficking
in Persons.”16 However, questions remain as to whether some of the actions taken by the
U.S. government to combat trafficking live up to this aggressive rhetoric.
This paper will examine the legal steps being taken by the United States to combat
the sexual trafficking that tends to flourish near U.S. military bases. Part II will discuss
the history of the U.S. military and its complicit relationship with prostitution near its
military bases. This section will also explore international efforts to combat trafficking
and will explain why these efforts are insufficient. Finally, Part II will examine the
10
Enforcing U.S. Policies Against Trafficking in Persons: How is the U.S. Military Doing?: Hearing
Before the U.S. Comm’n on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the House Armed Services Comm.,
108th Cong. 2 (2004) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Rep. Christopher Smith, Chairman, U.S.
Comm’n on Security and Cooperation in Europe), available at
http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?Fuseaction=UserGroups.Home&ContentRecord_id=287&ContentType=B
&UserGroup_id=69&Subaction=Hearings&CFID=18547223&CFTOKEN=84789441.
11
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT , supra note 1, at 13-14; Tiefenbrun, supra note 3, at 136.
12
President’s Address to the United Nations General Assembly, 39 W EEKLY COMP . PRES. DOC. 1256,
1259 (September 23, 2003).
13
U.S., Norwegian Envoys to NATO Brief on Anti-Trafficking Policy; NATO, EPAC should take steps to
implement zero tolerance policy, Burns says, FED. INFO. AND NEWS DISPATCH, July 9, 2004 [hereinafter
NATO anti-trafficking policy].
14
Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Trafficking in Persons National Security
Presidential Directive (Feb. 25, 2003) [hereinafter Trafficking Press Release],
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030225.html; Hearings, supra note 10, at 3
(testimony of Rep. Christopher Smith, Chairman, U.S. Comm’n on Security and Cooperation in Europe);
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE , OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, A SSESSMENT OF DOD EFFORTS TO
COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS: PHASE II – BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AND KOSOVO 5 n.2 (2003)
[hereinafter PHASE II REPORT ], available at http://www.dodig.osd.mil/fo/foia/HT-Phase_II.pdf.
15
Memorandum from Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, to Secretaries of the Military
Departments and the members of the Department of Defense (Jan. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Wolfowitz memo]
(on file with author).
16
Memorandum from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, to Secretaries of the Military Departments
and the members of the Department of Defense (Sept. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Rumsfeld memo] (on file with
author).
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recent events that led to the United States’ aggressive stance toward trafficking in general
and, more specifically, sexual trafficking near military bases. Part III will focus on two
legal avenues proposed by the United States to combat sexual trafficking. First, a recent
change to the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM) specifically prohibits the soliciting of
prostitutes by all military personnel. 17 Second, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Act of 2000 may allow civilian contractors that are involved in trafficking activities
abroad to be prosecuted in the United States. 18 Part IV will examine some of the
weaknesses of these and other measures and offer suggestions on ways to combat sexual
trafficking near military bases more effectively.
II. HISTORY
A. The Relationship Between the United States Military and Prostitution
¶8

¶9

Some of the first documented cases of an ongoing U.S. military connection to
prostitution occurred on bases near the Mexican border and in the Philippines in the early
1900s.19 The primary concern of the military became the threat of soldiers contracting a
venereal disease (VD) from the prostitutes. 20 To protect against this, the military began
to require that local prostitutes be inspected by military doctors every week or two. 21
Rather than attempt to end the practice altogether by prohibiting the activity, the military
instead chose merely to screen the prostitutes for the servicemen to make sure that they
were not carrying a disease.
In the early to mid 1900s, however, some government officials began efforts to end
the practice of prostitution ne ar military bases. 22 One of the main reasons for this was
that venereal disease proved to be a severe problem for the military. 23 To combat the
spread of disease, local governments and the military increased the policing of red- light
districts. 24 In addition, during World War I soldiers could be court- martialed or have
their pay withheld if they contracted a VD as a result of visiting a prostitute. 25 Combating
prostitution once again came into focus around WWII. For example, the House of
17

Exec. Order No. 13,387, 70 Fed. Reg. 60,697, 60,701 (Oct. 18, 2005).
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267 (2000); Glenn R. Schmitt, Closing
the Gap in Criminal Jurisdiction Over Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces Abroad – A First Person
Account of the Creation of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000, 51 CATH. U. L. RE V. 55,
56 (2001).
19
A LLAN M. BRANDT , NO M AGIC BULLET : A SOCIAL HISTORY OF VENEREAL DISEASE IN THE UNITED
STATES SINCE 1880, 53-56 (1985); Saundra Pollock Sturdevant & Brenda Stolzfus, Disparate Threads of
the Whole: An Interpretive Essay, in LET THE GOOD TIMES ROLL 300, 303 (1992).
20
BRANDT , supra note 19, at 54. Even at the time, this was not a new phenomenon. A legend in
military circles tells a story of Napolean who was decorating a soldier for bravery and inquired about his
health. When asked whether he had ever contracted gonorrhea, the soldier said, “Yes sir; 100 times.”
Napolean said, “Were you cured?” And the soldier replied, “I was cured 99 times; every time but the first
time.” See To Prohibit Prostitution Within Reasonable Distance of Military and Naval Establishments:
Hearing on H.R. 2475 Before the House Comm. on Military Affairs, 77th Cong. 16 (1941) [hereinafter
Hearing on H.R. 2475] (statement of Hon. Fiorello H. LaGuardia, Mayor, New York City).
21
BRANDT , supra note 19, at 54, Sturdevent & Stolzfus, supra note 19.
22
BRANDT , supra note 19, at 52.
23
Id. at 36 (noting that in 1909 venereal disease accounted for over one-third of all days lost by Army
personnel).
24
Id. at 53-57.
25
Nancy K. Ota, Flying Buttresses, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 693, 706 (2000).
18
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Representatives he ld hearings in 1945 to discuss permanently extending an earlier act that
prohibited prostitution in and around military and naval establishments. 26 Even then,
however, one of the main motivations for ending this practice was “maintaining the
health of the young boys.”27
¶10
Despite these and other efforts, the assumption that men “required the sexual use of
women’s bodies” remained, and by the time of the Vietnam War the military for the most
part relented in order to “keep the troops contented and satisfied.”28 For example, the
United States began stationing troops in Korea in 1955, and during the next forty years
over one million Korean women served as sex providers for the U.S. military. 29 During
this time, the United States also signed “Rest and Relaxation” (R&R) agreements with
the Philippines and Thailand. 30 Pursuant to these agreements, the governments of these
countries were obligated to provide R&R centers, commonly known as Intoxication and
Intercourse by the troops, for U.S. military personnel. 31
¶11
Many of these practices have continued to the present day. In 1997, a sting
operation uncovered a prostitution ring operating in Texas near a military base. 32 Recent
reports indicate that U.S. soldiers near Abu Ghraib solicited sex from Iraqi prostitutes. 33
Nearly every military base both at home and abroad is surrounded by a thriving sex
industry. 34 Although the military generally does not take on as active of a role in
providing military doctors to check prostitutes, it often expects that the host country will
monitor them. 35 However, U.S. Army officials in Korea are continuing to check the
health records, including AIDS test results, of night club workers who work near U.S.
military bases. 36 These foreign entertainers are required to complete health exams every
three months, and the entertainers feel that these practices run counter to the army’s
campaign against human trafficking and prostitution. 37 If certain establishments have
prostitutes with known sexually transmitted diseases, the military will place them off
limits for both military personnel and civilians at the base. 38 Overall, there exists an
extensive problem of both patronization of brothels by servicemen and indirect control of
brothel management by military officials. 39

26

Hearing on H.R. 2475, supra note 20.
Id. at 5.
28
SUSAN BROWNMILLER, A GAINST OUR WILL : M EN, W OMEN AND RAPE 93-94 (1975).
29
KATHARINE H.S. M OON, SEX AMONG ALLIES: M ILITARY PROSTITUTION IN U.S.-KOREA RELATIONS 1
(1997).
30
RITA NAKASHIMA BROCK & SUSAN BROOKS THISTLEWAITE, CASTING STONES: PROSTITUTION AND
LIBERATION IN A SIA AND THE UNITED STATES 5, 116-118 (1996).
31
Id. at 5.
32
Texas Prostitution Sting Snags War Games Troops, N.Y. TIMES, April 22, 1997.
33
Miller, supra note 6.
34
See Chang, supra note 5, at 631.
35
Id. at 632.
36
Seth Robinson, Examination of S. Korean Nightclub Workers’ Health Records Stirs Debate, STARS
AND STRIPES, Nov. 28, 2004,
http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=24839&archive=true.
37
Id.
38
Chang, supra note 5, at 632.
39
Id. at 621; Talleyrand, supra note 4.
27
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B. International Efforts and Their Inadequacies
¶12

Although the international community has taken steps to combat trafficking, these
efforts have had little success in curbing the practice near military bases. One of the
biggest steps began in 1998, when the United Nations General Assembly established a
committee to negotiate an international convention against transnational organized
crime. 40 After two years of work, the General Assembly adopted the UN Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime along with two additional optional protocols. 41
One of the optional protocols was the U.N. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. 42 One hundred twenty- five
states signed the convention when it was opened for signature and eighty-one states
additionally signed the supplemental protocol on trafficking in persons. 43 The optional
protocol on trafficking in persons officially went into force on December 25, 2003; to
date, 117 states are signatories and ninety- five have ratified the protocol. 44 The protocol
defines “trafficking in persons” as:
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons,
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control of another person, for the
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. 45

¶13

As a ratifying member of the protocol, member states are required to comply with a
number of responsibilities. For example, member states are required to enact legislative
measures that criminalize acts of trafficking as defined in the statute, 46 provide assistance
and protection to victims of trafficking in persons, 47 and set up programs to aid in the
prevention of trafficking, 48 including training sessions for law enforcement and other

40

G.A. Res. 111, U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 53rd Sess., 85th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 101, U.N. Doc.
A/53/PV.85 (1998); Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 95 A M. J.
INT ’L L. 387, 407 (Sean D. Murphy ed., 2001) [hereinafter Murphy].
41
GA Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Agenda Item 105, U.N. Doc. A/55/383 (2000); Murphy, supra
note 40.
42
GA Res. 25, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Annex II, Agenda Item 105, at 31, U.N. Doc. A/55/383 (2000)
[hereinafter Protocol on Trafficking], available at
http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/convention_%20traff_eng.pdf.
43
Murphy, supra note 40, at 407-08.
44
The protocol went into force in accordance with article 17, which provided it go into effect 90 days
after the fourtieth state had ratified it. See
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_cicp_signatures_trafficking.html [hereinafter Signatories] (last
visited Jan. 14, 2006).
45
Protocol on Trafficking, supra note 42, at 2, Article 3(a).
46
Id. at 3, Article 5.
47
Id., Article 6.
48
Id. at 5, Article 9.
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relevant officials. 49 Some of the countries in which the United States has a military
presence, such as South Korea, are merely signatories to the protocol and ha ve not yet
ratified it. 50 However, many countries in which the U.S. has a military presence, such as
Bosnia and Herzegovina, have signed and ratified the protocol. 51 Bosnia is a prime
example of an area where the conditions of the optional protocol on trafficking in persons
are in dire need of implementation, as a recent study showed that 90 percent of people
from whom sexual services are purchased in Bosnia are victims of trafficking. 52 A 2002
report on the region showed that the Bosnian government failed to make serious efforts to
enforce laws that criminalize trafficking or enact measures to support victims of
trafficking. 53
¶14
In addition, authorities in places like Bosnia and Herzegovina may encounter
difficulties implementing all of the conditions of the protocol due to the questionable
status of foreign peacekeepers serving there. In general, U.S. bases in foreign countries
and the personnel stationed there are governed by Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA). 54
SOFA’s are bilateral agreements between sovereign nations that cover topics such as how
to deal with U.S. personnel who commit crimes in host countries. 55 U.S. forces serving in
Bosnia and Herzegovina are serving as NATO forces and are governed by the SOFA of
the Dayton Peace Accords. 56 While all forces enjoy functional immunity for acts
committed while carrying out their official duties under the Dayton Peace Accords, only
military personnel are under the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective nations. 57
Civilian contractors, on the other hand, are open to prosecution by host countries for any
other crimes committed in that country, including criminal activities involving
trafficking. 58
¶15
Unfortunately, the Bosnian government has continually granted civilian contractors
the same status as military personnel and refused to prosecute them under any
circumstances because of a supposed lack of jurisdiction. 59 The chief of police of a
village near a peacekeeping establishment expressed his frustration when he said, “We
couldn’t bring charges. . .under Anne x IA of [the Dayton Agreement]. . .When we find a
foreigner is involved, this is the biggest problem for us. We can’t do anything against
them - they are above the law.”60 Even when the host country does assert that it retains
jurisdiction to prosecute these civilians, the country often lacks either the resources or the
49

Id. at 6, Article 10.
Signatories, supra note 44.
51
Id.
52
NATO anti-trafficking policy, supra note 13.
53
Martina E. Vandenberg, Hopes Betrayed: Trafficking of Women and Girls to Post-Conflict Bosnia
and Herzegovina for Forced Prostitution, 14 HUM. RTS. W ATCH NO. 9 (D) 1, 21-22 (2002),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/bosnia/Bosnia1102.pdf.
54
Gwyn Kirk & Carolyn Bowen Francis, Redefining Security: Women Challenge U.S. Military Policy
and Practice in East Asia, 15 BERKELEY W OMEN’S L.J. 229, 250 (2000).
55
Id.
56
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina-Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Dayton Agreement on
Implementing the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nov. 21, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 170 (1996), available
at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosagree.html; PHASE II REPORT , supra note 14, at 14.
57
Vandenberg, supra note 53, at 46-47.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 47-48.
60
Hearings, supra note 10, at 126 (prepared statement of Martina E. Vandenberg, Attorney, Jenner &
Block).
50
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political will to do so. 61 Additionally, when investigations do occur, contract employees
are typically repatriated almost immediately to the United States to avoid testifying and
facing criminal charges. 62
¶16
As long as countries that have ratified the UN protocol on trafficking in persons
actually fulfill their obligations under it, the protocol should have a dramatic impact on
trafficking overall. Criminalizing trafficking, protecting the victims, and educating law
enforcement will work to limit the supply of trafficked women near U.S. military bases.
However, as is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, efforts to comply with the protocol
face an uphill battle. Additionally, problems remain with regard to both the legal status
of military personnel and civilian contractors and the lack of political will to prosecute
Americans. In any event, international efforts in this area are just one part of dealing
with the problem of trafficking. To successfully combat trafficking near military bases,
the U.S. must somehow deal with the fact that their military bases create a huge demand
for trafficked women. Until this demand is extinguished or at least lessened
considerably, there will continue to be an influx of trafficked women to the areas
surrounding U.S. military bases.
C. Recent domestic developments in the fight against trafficking
¶17

In the fall of 2000, Congress overwhelmingly voted in favor of legislation to
toughen laws against trafficking in persons. 63 On October 28, President Clinton signed
into law the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000. 64 The Act defines sex
trafficking as “the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a
person for the purpose of a commercial sex act.”65 The purposes of the Act are to
“combat trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims
are predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective punishment of
traffickers, and to protect their victims.”66 Generally, the Act aims to fulfill these
purposes in much the same way as the optional protocol on trafficking in persons,
through the “three P’s” of prevention, protection, and prosecution. 67 The Act aims to
prevent trafficking by encouraging international cooperation and by imposing economic
sanctions on countries that fail to meet its minimum criteria. 68 The Act also aims to
protect victims of trafficking who assist authorities in prosecuting traffickers by allowing
them to be eligible for temporary residency in the United States. 69 Finally, the Act
attempts to prosecute traffickers by imposing harsher sentences under new criminal
charges. 70
61

Vandenberg, supra note 53, at 46; P.W. Singer, War, Profits and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized
Military Firms and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT ’L L. 521, 535 (2004).
62
PHASE II REPORT , supra note 14, at 22.
63
371 to 1 in the House, 95 to 0 in the Senate. 146 CONG. REC. H9047-48 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 2000); 146
CONG. REC. S10228 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000).
64
Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7110 (2000).
65
22 U.S.C. § 7102.
66
22 U.S.C. § 7101.
67
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT , supra note 1, at 5; Kara C. Ryf, Comment, The First Modern AntiSlavery Act: The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT ’L L. 45, 53 (2002).
68
22 U.S.C. § 7104.
69
22 U.S.C. § 7105.
70
22 U.S.C. § 7109.
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¶18

The responsibility for carrying out many of these new policies falls on a new
Interagency Task Force required by the Act. 71 The task force is chaired by the Secretary
of State and is created to “monitor and combat trafficking.”72 Among its many
responsibilities, the Act requires the task force to measure foreign government efforts to
end severe forms of trafficking that occur within their countries. 73 The results of this
research are published by the State Department in an annual Trafficking in Persons
Report. 74 This report details the efforts of foreign countries to combat trafficking and
assigns them to one of three tiers based on their level of compliance with the minimum
standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons. 75 This information is then used to
help determine if countries will be subject to the non- humanitarian, non-trade-related
economic sanctions that may be implemented against any country with a poor record of
compliance. 76
¶19
After the passage of the Act, stories began to circulate that caused the United States
to turn a more watchful eye to the possible trafficking activities that were being
perpetrated by their own military personnel abroad. For example, in an investigation
from 1999-2001, Human Rights Watch found evidence of widespread trafficking in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 77 Particularly disturbing was the fact that members of the
United Nations International Police Task Force engaged in trafficking activities
themselves. 78 Since they enjoy immunity from prosecution under the Dayton Peace
Agreement, the only sanctions U.N. officials could bring against them were removal from
service and repatria tion. 79 In addition, there were at least eight cases of U.S. contractors
who allegedly purchased trafficked women to work as their personal servants. 80 Human
Rights Watch discovered that none of the contractors faced any criminal penalties upon
returning to the United States.81
¶20
In the spring of 2002, Fox News reporter Tom Merriman of Ohio aired a segment
on the activities of U.S. servicemen in South Korea. 82 The broadcast showed scenes
taken by a hidden camera in which servicemen from the base were socializing with
women in bars while military courtesy patrols stood watch nearby. 83 Most of the women
were Filipino or Russian women who had been lured there by the promise of good jobs,
but instead were forced to work as bar hosts and prostitutes. 84 The tapes helped to bring
to light the key role that servicemen played in the trafficking of women to South Korea.
As political scientist Katharine Moon explains, servicemen “are the demand and women

71

22 U.S.C. § 7103.
22 U.S.C. § 7103.
73
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT , supra note 1, at 5.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 25.
76
Id. at 31.
77
Vandenberg, supra note 53, at 4.
78
Id. at 49-54.
79
Id. at 47.
80
Hearings, supra note 10, at 30 (testimony of Martina E. Vandenberg, Attorney, Jenner & Block).
81
Vandenberg, supra note 53, at 67.
82
Mary Jacoby, Does U.S. Abet Korean Sex Trade?, ST . PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 9, 2002, available at
http://www.sptimes.com/2002/12/09/Worldandnation/Does_US_abet_Korean_s.shtml.
83
Id.
84
Id.
72
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are the supply.”85 This not uncommon situation demonstrated that U.S. military bases
create a large demand for prostitutes and trafficked women throughout the world.
¶21
These revelations sparked a wave of actions by various representatives of the U.S.
government. Twelve members of Congress, led by U.S. Representative Christopher
Smith, called for an investigation by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense
to look into the allegations by Fox News regarding South Korea. 86 Additionally, on
February 13, 2002, President Bush signed Executive Order 13257, which established the
Cabinet- level Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons that
was specified in the TVPA. 87 President Bush next issued a national security presidential
directive, NSPD-22, which established a “zero-tolerance” policy for U.S. government
employees and contracted personnel representing the U.S. abroad who engage in
trafficking activities. 88 NSPD-22 specifically states that the “policy of the United States
is to attack vigorously the worldwide problem of trafficking in persons, using law
enforcement efforts, diplomacy, and all other appropriate tools.”89 NSPD-22 also directs
all relevant federal agencies to “strengthen their collective efforts, capabilities, and
coordination to support the policy to combat trafficking in persons.”90 Finally, the
Directive states that “our policy is based on an abolitionist approach to trafficking in
persons, and our efforts must involve a comprehensive attack on such trafficking, which
is a modern day form of slavery.”91
¶22
In 2003, the Department of Defense Inspector General released two reports that
documented its investigations of Korea and Bosnia and Herzegovina that had been called
for by Rep. Smith. These reports verified some of the earlier stories about military
personnel engaging in activities that promoted and facilitated trafficking activities near
U.S. bases, but also trumpeted the steps that had been taken to stop these activities and
even announced that United States Forces Korea (USFK) “has set the example for other
overseas commanders who may encounter the impact of human trafficking.”92 On July
10, 2003, the Inspector General released the first report, “Assessment of DoD Efforts to
Combat Trafficking in Persons, Phase 1 – United States Forces Korea.”93 One of the
main prongs of their assessment examined the demand side of trafficking through “the
adequacy of ongoing programs sponsored by USFK to curb Service member use of offbase establishments that may traffic in persons.”94 Efforts to reduce Service member
demand in this area focused on: “(1) educating Service members on national policy
regarding human trafficking, on the requirement for exemplary conduct by all Service
members, and on the illegality of prostitution under Korean law and USFK regulations,
85
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and (2) improving on-base recreational facilities so those facilities become viable
alternatives to off-base entertainment attractions.”95 The Inspector General found that
USFK had “embraced” their recommendations to bolster the educational efforts and that
efforts to improve on-base recreational activities were “sufficient.”96
¶23
On December 8, 2003 the Inspector General released the second part of the report
entitled “Assessment of DoD Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Persons, Phase II –
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo”. 97 The Inspector General again reported “generally
favorable findings” on the actions of U.S. Service members, but admitted that they
contributed to the human trafficking problem “at some, undefined level.”98 In addition,
there was also evidence of “some level of DoD contractor involvement” in trafficking
activities. 99 One of the recommendations made by the report called on the Department of
Defense to establish a policy on human trafficking that encourages commanders to:
1. educate service members on human trafficking issues,
2. increase law enforcement efforts as needed to place offending
entertainment establishments off limits,
3. incorporate anti- human trafficking provisions in overseas contracts, and
4. examine human trafficking matters as part of established IG inspection
activities. 100
¶24

As these reports by the Department of Defense came out, tough talk by the United
States continued. On September 23, 2003, President Bush called on the United Nations
General Assembly to “show new energy in fighting back an old evil.”101 Later that year,
the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003 was signed into law. 102
Among other things, the Act created a “Special Watch List” of Tier 2 countries that
should receive special scrutiny in addition to a requirement that countries provide data on
trafficking-related activities in order to be considered for Tier 1 status. 103
¶25
Only months later, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz issued a
memorandum implementing the President’s new zero-tolerance policy throughout the
Department of Defense. 104 This memo echoed the four main objectives that had been
called for by the Inspector General to help the Department of Defense combat trafficking
in persons. In summary, these objectives stated the need to:
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1. educate Service members and civilians about trafficking and the
expectations of their actions in regard to it
2. deny access to establishments involved in trafficking activities
3. incorporate provisions that impose penalties on contractor employees
who participate in trafficking activities
4. evaluate efforts to combat trafficking with the Inspector General. 105
Finally, on September 16, 2004, Secretary Rumsfeld issued a statement reiterating the
commitment to the zero-tolerance policy outlined by the Deputy Secretary of Defense
and calling on the leaders in the department to never “turn a blind eye to this issue.”106
¶26
Amidst all of the strongly-worded statements by the government, the question begs
to be asked: What steps is the government taking to implement the objectives of the
Department of Defense? And as the proliferation of sex trafficking near United States
military bases continues to be a black eye on the legitimacy of our efforts to combat
trafficking worldwide, what initiatives are being carried out to stop these trafficking
activities by U.S. citizens?
III. CURRENT LEGAL EFFORTS
¶27

As is evidenced by the stories in South Korea and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in
order to combat trafficking near U.S. military bases the actions of both military
servicemen and civilian contractors must be dealt with. Legally, the United States
military members are governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
Unfortunately, the legal status of the civilian contractors who work alongside servicemen
is not as clearly defined.
A. The Uniform Code of Military Justice

¶28

All servicemen in the United States military are subject to the rules and regulations
of the UCMJ. The UCMJ is enacted by Congress and is essentially a complete set of
criminal laws. 107 The UCMJ is implemented through Executive Orders of the President
which form a comprehensive set of laws known as the Manual for Courts-Martial
(MCM). 108 On the subject of prostitution, the Manual for Courts-Martial until recently
provided in relevant part in paragraph 97b, Part IV, that:
(1) Prostitution.
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(a) That the accused had sexual intercourse with another person not the
accused’s spouse;
(b) That the accused did so for the purpose of receiving money or other
compensation
(2) Pandering by compelling, inducing, enticing, or procuring act of
prostitution.
(a) That the accused compelled, induced, enticed, or procured a certain
person to engage in an act of sexual intercourse for hire and reward with a
person to be directed to said person by the accused.
(3) Pandering by arranging or receiving consideration for arranging for
sexual intercourse or sodomy.
(a) That the accused arranged for, or received valuable consideration for
arranging for, a certain person to engage in sexual intercourse or sodomy
with another person. 109
¶29

Military personnel can also be prosecuted for soliciting or patronizing a prostitute
under the General Article of 134 of the UCMJ. 110 Article 134 allows the military to
prosecute servicemen and women for acts that are not specifically enumerated in either
the UCMJ or MCM. 111 In part, Article 134 provides that all disorders that are “to the
prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces” or are “conduct of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed forces” are to be punished by the discretion of the court
according to the “nature and degree of the offense.”112
¶30
In United States v. Miller, the Court considered whether soliciting a prostitute in
fact fell within the MCM under the purview of pandering, which would incur the stiffer
penalties of section (2). 113 The government argued that the wording of paragraph
97b(2)(a) uses only the term “a person” to describe the individual with whom the
prostitute has sexual intercourse. 114 However, paragraph 97b(3)(a) specifically uses the
term “another person” to identify the same relationship. 115 Since section (2) did not
specifically require that the sexual intercourse be directed to “another person” the
government contended that a serviceman who solicited a prostitute to have sex with him
would fall within the definition. The Court disagreed and ruled that the ambiguity of
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section (2) required them to rule in favor of the appellant and agreed that the crime of
pandering required a third party. 116
¶31
However, the Court upheld the appellant’s conviction for solicitation. The lower
court found that Miller’s actions violated the General Article of 134 under the UCMJ
because “asking others to engage in sex for compensation is prejudicial to good order and
discipline or of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.”117 Therefore, although
soliciting a prostitute was not found to be a punishable offense under the MCM, it would
still seem that no further action would be required by the government since the act of
soliciting a prostitute has been deemed to be covered under Article 134 of the UCMJ.
¶32
In the Inspector General’s report for the Department of Defense, the Inspector
General stated that the investigation “found potential weaknesses on the part of U.S.
military leadership in the Balkans in addressing human trafficking issues . . . . There are
no specific prohibitions on patronizing prostitutes or engaging in other activities that may
directly support human trafficking.”118 Additionally, the report stated that “[b]ecause
there is no military standard that directly addresses patronization of prostitutes and other
activities associated with human trafficking, criminal prosecution of these activities under
military law is rendered more difficult.”119 In light of these findings, against the backdrop
of a tradition of allowing and even encouraging the solicitation of prostitutes by military
personnel, and with the knowledge that the decision in Miller left few if any alternatives,
the government proposed changes to the MCM making soliciting a prostitute a specific
offense. Although the Department of Defense realized that this activity remained
chargeable under Article 134 of the UCMJ, as Principal Deputy Undersecretary of
Defense Charles Abell testified, the Department hoped that “this change will make the
offense visible, observable. It will raise command attention, and it will make it more
visible to the Service member who might be tempted.”120
¶33
In response to these needs, the Department of Defense proposed to insert the
following language in the Manual for Court-Martial:
(2) Patronizing a Prostitute
(a) That the accused had sexual intercourse with another person not the
accused’s spouse;
(b) That the accused compelled, induced, enticed, or procured such person
to engage in acts of sexual intercourse in exchange for money or other
compensation. 121
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These proposed changes were adopted by Executive Order 13,387 on October 18,
2005.122 It is still too early to tell what impact these recent changes will have on the
conduct of servicemen.
B. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000
¶34

Even if these changes significantly curb the solicitation of trafficked women by
servicemen, the issue of how to deal with civilian contractors who reside at military bases
and contribute to the problem of trafficking must also be addressed. Civilians who
accompany the military overseas are not subject to military jurisdiction, except during
times of war. 123 When civilians accompanying the Armed Forces overseas commit
serious offenses and the host country fails to exercise jurisdiction, a “jurisdiction gap” is
created where these civilians face no cons equences for their actions. 124 However, one law
that could be used to prosecute civilian contractors involved in trafficking near military
bases is the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA). 125 This law
expands the jurisdiction of the United States and has received national attention recently
as a possible means of prosecuting civilian contractors who are involved in the abuse of
Iraqi prisoners, such as those at Abu Ghraib. 126
¶35
Due to the lack of jurisdiction over civilians serving overseas and the fact that
many foreign governments neglect to prosecute offenders, the unfortunate result is that
people who commit crimes while accompanying the Armed Forces overseas often go
unpunished. 127 After many years of effort, Congress attempted to deal with this problem
by enacting the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000. 128 The MEJA extends
federal jurisdiction to include citizens who accompany the U.S. Armed Forces abroad. 129
Specifically, the MEJA extends the jurisdiction of federal courts to cover felony level
offenses (punishable by more than one year in prison) that would apply under federal law
if the offense had occurred within the territories of the United States. 130 The MEJA also
continues to respect SOFAs in that it does not allow prosecution under the Act if a
foreign government has prosecuted or is prosecuting the person. 131
¶36
However, one of the major loopholes still existing after the passage of the MEJA is
that it covers only a limited class of civilians. Specifically, the MEJA permits
prosecution of civilians “employed by or accompanying” American Armed Forces. 132 On
its face, the statute would appear to cover all civilian contractors who are “employed by”
or “accompany” the Armed Forces abroad. However, the definitions given by the statute
limit the term “employed by” to include only civilian employees, contractors and
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subcontractors employed by the Department of Defense. 133 In addition, the term
“accompanying” is limited to include only the dependents of members of the Armed
Forces, civilian personnel and contractors. 134 This limitation means that any civilian
contractor working for another government agency such as the Department of State
would be immune from prosecution. 135 Given its narrow scope, it appears unlikely that
the MEJA will be able to end the contributions to trafficking by civilians accompanying
the U.S. military abroad.
¶37
There have been discussions about ways to fix this shortcoming of the MEJA. For
example, in May of 2004 a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives that
would extend the jurisdiction of the MEJA. 136 Specifically, the amendment would
expand the jurisdiction of the MEJA to cover civilian contractors who commit federal
offenses “while supporting the mission of the Department of Defense overseas.”137 In
theory, this would provide a broader scope to the law because contractors who work for
the United States and support the mission of the Department of Defense would now be
subject to prosecution under the MEJA. However, at this point civilian contractors still
enjoy almost unlimited immunity for their actions at U.S. military bases.
IV. WEAKNESSES OF THE P ROPOSED CHANGES
¶38

In its fight to combat human trafficking, the U.S. government has continually made
aggressive statements about its commitment to stopping this international problem.
Although actions have been taken to make soliciting a prostitute a specific chargeable
offense for servicemen, more steps need to be taken to ensure that servicemen are not
contributing to the demand-side of the problem of sexual trafficking. Further, the scope
of the MEJA is insufficient to effectively deal with the issue of civilian contractors who
participate in trafficking activities. Even an expansion of the scope of the MEJA to cover
all contractors who engage in specific trafficking activities would do nothing to deal with
contractors who create a demand for trafficked women by merely patronizing prostitutes.
The following section will explore some of the weaknesses that need to be addressed to
stop the flow of trafficked women to areas near military bases and will offer suggestions
on how to deal with this problem more effectively in the future.
A. Military

¶39

In the Phase 1 report by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the
assessment examined two main programs implemented by the United States Forces
Korea (USFK) to curb the use of off-base prostitution establishments that often have
links to trafficking activities. These programs focus on two areas: (1) “educating Service
members” on the issues associated with human trafficking and the national policy
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regarding it, and (2) improving recreational facilities so that they become “viable
alternatives to off-base entertainment attractions.”138
¶40
The U.S. has taken several steps to educate their service members about human
trafficking. For example, the Department of Defense has developed a core training
module for all military and contractor personnel deployed overseas. 139 The module will
be used to educate Department of Defense members about the nature of trafficking, the
Department’s policy on trafficking, and the provisions available to implement this
policy. 140 The training will be available to all service members electronically through the
Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability System. 141 In addition, the
actions of the USFK in this area may serve as a model for how to educate forces stationed
at other military bases around the globe. USFK has developed a human trafficking and
prostitution core curriculum that begins within the very first week of in-processing at the
base.142 This training continues during other collective and leadership training
opportunities and is reinforced through the widespread dissemination of the Command’s
zero-tolerance message through the newspaper, radio and television. 143
¶41
Even as the U.S. attempts to educate the Service members about the detrimental
effects of human trafficking, the general attitude that many servicemen hold towards
prostitutes may be the most significant obstacle the U.S. will face. The U.S. military has
a long history of allowing and even encouraging soldiers serving abroad to patronize
prostitutes. 144 Now that the military has recognized that these activities often support
sexual trafficking and help to undermine their mission, it has taken steps to stop this
practice. Encouraging reports out of Korea indicate that the United States has prosecuted
nearly 400 U.S. Service members stationed in Korea for actions relating to prostitution
during 2004 and more than 800 areas known for ties to prostitution have been designated
as off- limits to soldiers. 145 However, after allowing this activity to continue for so long,
the military will likely encounter great difficulty changing a culture that has historically
permitted soldiers to patronize prostitutes.
¶42
For example, troops stationed in countries where prostitution is not illegal are
already voicing their displeasure over the recent changes to the MCM. 146 Some, such as
Army Sgt. Adam Z. Pastor, who serves on a German base that is situated near a thriving
red light district, expressed a belief that not all instances of prostitution are linked with
sex trafficking when he stated that “[i]t would be different if it were some third-world
country that had no jobs and no opportunity, and women were forced into it.”147 Even
138
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some soldiers who do not visit prostitutes themselves assert that “[i]t’s none of [the
military’s] business what soldiers do off base. If a soldier wants to have sex with a
prostitute and ruin his life that’s his problem, not the military’s.”148 Unfortunately, these
opinions merely serve to highlight the lack of understanding by servicemen about the
extent of the problem of human trafficking. Although they may not think that any of
these women were “forced into it,” the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe has reported that the majority of women “trafficked for the sex industry are
trafficked to large cities, vacation and tourist areas, and areas near military bases in
Europe.”149
¶43
This attitude towards the act of patronizing a prostitute could also hinder
enforcement of the proposed changes. Military officers who have been consistently lax
in cracking down on soldiers who solicit prostitutes will more than likely continue to do
so. Further, it may not be very likely that soldiers who are brought up on charges will
face the maximum penalty of a dishonorable discharge. 150 Military courts that require a
two-thirds vote or greater for a court- martial likely would give great weight to whether
the offense was committed in a country where prostitution is legal. 151
¶44
There is also evidence that the current organizational culture of the military may be
responsible for a less than comprehensive effort to implement the zero-tolerance policy
promulgated by the Department of Defense. Department of Defense officials who
worked closely with the reports on trafficking questioned the veracity of these reports,
commenting that those responsible for the Phase 2 report would “wash this report; they
are washing the Korea report.”152 Similarly disturbing is the methodology employed by
the Inspector General investigators doing research for these reports. For example,
meetings on the bases would typically begin with closed-ended questions such as “Do
you have any problems with trafficking here?”153 The person being interviewed would
unsurprisingly answer that there was no trafficking problem, creating a situation in which
evidence of trafficking would literally have to “fall in the laps” of the inspectors for them
to have any chance of uncovering it. 154 These problems highlight a large r cultural reality
of the military, which makes strong statements about fighting trafficking while at the
same time downplaying the significance of the problem.
¶45
To combat this, the government should continue to follow the first objective laid
out by the Department of Defense that expressed a desire to educate “all Service
members and DoD civilians serving overseas on the worldwide trafficking menace.”155
As it stands now, the practice of soliciting a prostitute has been so common for so long
that aggressive attempts to stop solicitation likely will encounter strong resistance. The
best way to alleviate this resistance is to first thoroughly educate all members of the
Armed Forces about the realities of human trafficking and to explain that their money is
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funding criminal elements when they visit a prostitute. 156 Current efforts, such as the
training module that has been released by the Department of Defense, fail “to engage the
audience with the kind of personal case studies or discussions that can shake callous
attitudes toward prostitutes and inspire investigators to treat trafficking as the outrageous
human rights violation that it is.”157 The efforts of the USFK may be able to be used as a
model, as all Department of Defense personnel arriving in Korea receive training on the
“harmful and dehumanizing practice of human trafficking and [the] policy of zerotolerance.”158 Only as these education programs continue to be implemented will a true
policy of zero-tolerance be allowed to take hold in the military.
¶46
In addition, pursuant to the recommendations of the Inspector General of the
Department of Defense, the U.S. military has taken steps to not only educate its personnel
on trafficking, but to furnish viable on-site alternatives to leaving the base and potentially
visiting prostitutes. Again, the USFK has attempted to set an example by supporting
quality of life initiatives that make available various athletic, educational, spiritual, and
recreational activities for the personnel. 159 For example, these initiatives include
“expanded evening and weekend education programs, free internet access for on- line
education and e- university programs, installation-sponsored band concerts, late- night
sports leagues and tournaments, expanded chaplains’ activities, and increased operating
hours for athletic and dining facilities . . . .”160 While proposed in good faith, these
measures sound somewhat akin to high school parents and faculty hosting a post-prom
party to offer an alternative so that the students do not drink. Where the overall demand
for prostitutes creates a readily available supply to satisfy their sexual desires, the
availability of pick-up basketball games and prayer services probably will not have much
of an effect.
B. Civilian Contractors
¶47

Even if the government is able to get a handle on the servicemen who contribute to
the spread of sexual trafficking, given the increasing number of civilians who work
alongside the military it is imperative that steps be taken to cease their involvement in
sexual trafficking as well. The increase in the number of civilians who work with the
military as private contractors has been necessitated by the fact that the U.S. military has
shrunk from 2.1 million to 1.4 million active troops since the end of the Cold War. 161
Pentagon officials now say that they would not be able to carry on a war without the
assistance of private contractors. 162 In Iraq alone, U.S. authorities and independent
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experts say that the war has created 20,000 military jobs for private contractors. 163 In
fact, the United States does not have an accurate total of how many civilian contractors it
employs and has stationed around the world. 164 In March 2002, then Secretary of the
Army Thomas E. White issued a memo ordering the service to gather information on its
contractor workforce, including the total number of contract workers on the payroll. 165
Despite this order and the fact that this information would seemingly be important to
know, Army officials indicate that as of 2004 no data had been collected. 166
¶48
Regardless of the actual number of civilian contractors, the Office of the Inspector
General confirmed that contractors contribute to the trafficking problem in its 2003
report, which stated that “DOD contractor employees may have more than a limited role
in trafficking . . . .”167 Again, one of the main problems that will be encountered with
civilian contractors will be enforcement. In Bosnia, although there were several reports
of U.S. contractors actually purchasing women as chattel, there was no indication that
U.S. investigators even interviewed the trafficked victims. 168 Instead of encouraging
contractors who observed acts of trafficking to come forward with their stories, one
contractor who reported that eight of his colleagues had purchased women in 1999 and
2000 was fired. 169 To date, not a single contractor has been prosecuted using the
MEJA. 170 Recently, in a case that could potentially open the door to holding contractors
accountable, the government did indict a CIA contractor for allegedly beating a prisoner
to death with a flashlight in Afghanistan. 171 Still, there is little evidence that the
government intends to back up its strong words by actually prosecuting civilians thought
to be involved in acts of trafficking.
¶49
Another problem is the limited jurisdiction that is available under the MEJA.
Currently, only contractors who work for the Department of Defense can be prosecuted
under MEJA. 172 Therefore, contractors working for any other U.S. department are
immune from prosecution. Even the proposed changes to the MEJ A would do little to
“close this jurisdictional gap” because the amended MEJA would still require a nexus to
the Department of Defense to assert jurisdiction. 173 Further, since only one person has
been prosecuted under the MEJA, a lot of uncertainty exists about how it should be used.
The MEJA is a statute “that requires uniform implementation rules, and those still don’t
exist.”174 The lack of regulations that accompanied the MEJA have in many ways left it
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“dead on arrival.”175 After four years, the Department of Defense did finally propose
regulations that would implement the MEJA. 176 However, Rep. David Price, the author
of a proposed amendment to the MEJA, 177 admits that: “For all the good it’s done, MEJA
may as well not exist.”178
¶50
Finally, the third objective of the Department of Defense’s efforts to combat
trafficking states that it will incorporate provisions into overseas service contracts that
“prohibit any activities on the part of contractor employees that support or promote
trafficking in persons.”179 Although it is required by NSPD-22 and the Trafficking
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, the Department of Defense has not changed its
existing contracts to require that contractors not engage in trafficking. 180 Nor has it
incorporated a new clause into the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations Supplement
that would at least incorporate it into future contracts. 181 Without a threat of losing their
contracts or any form of punishment, contractors lack any real motivation to hold their
employees accountable.
¶51
In fact, the failure of the United States to hold contractors accountable for their
actions extends to the character of the personnel that are employed by these contractors.
Many companies who serve as contractors for the United States have recruited former
police officers and soldiers who themselves engaged in human rights violations from
regimes “such as apartheid South Africa, Augusto Pinochet’s Chile, and Slobodan
Milosevic’s Yugoslavia.”182 One Italian diplomat explains that “[e]veryone [] knows that
hundreds of men wanted for crimes against humanity have left the country to take jobs
[with U.S. contractors] in Iraq.”183 The lack of control the U.S. chooses to exercise over
whom contractors hire and the actions their employees take while they serve contributes
to more human right violations, whether it is prisoner abuse in Iraq or complicity with
trafficking activities near U.S. military bases.
¶52
Even if the United States is able to get a handle on the small percentage of
contractors that actively engage in trafficking activities, it will do little to slow the influx
of trafficked women to areas near military bases if contractors are still creating a large
demand for prostitutes. The MEJA only applies to offenses that are punishable by more
than one year in prison, 184 and the act of soliciting a prostitute by a contractor is not a
serious enough offense to invoke MEJA jurisdiction. Only through implementing
175
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provisions into overseas contracts which prohibit activities that promote trafficking will
the Department of Defense be able to eliminate the high demand for trafficked women
near its military bases.
C. Recommendations
¶53

Trafficking in persons continues to be a pervasive problem worldwide. The
majority of trafficking involves women and children used for sexual exploitation. From
the many memoranda and directives stating the United States’ strong stance against
trafficking, it appears that, if nothing else, there is a growing awareness of the nature of
the problem. However, until the United States takes the necessary steps to stop the
proliferation of sexual trafficking that occurs near its own military bases, such strong
words will ring hollow to the world. In the past, pressure has been applied on the
military to stop the practice of patronizing prostitutes to avoid contracting diseases or for
moral reasons. However, these efforts were aimed at protecting U.S. soldiers rather than
the victims of sexual trafficking. Today, it is more important than ever to take practical
steps to discourage the practice as most of the money that is made from the sex industry
ends up in the hands of criminals and sometimes even possible terrorists. 185 In fact, the
sex trafficking industry is slowly overtaking drug trafficking as the industry of choice for
international organized crime groups. 186 The fact that these profits end up funding
organized crime and terrorists undermines the purpose of the occupation.
¶54
The United States must not only make efforts to help limit the supply of trafficked
women; more importantly, it must seek to decrease the demand for prostitutes in the areas
around military bases. In order to stop military personnel from visiting prostitutes, they
must first be thoroughly educated about the effects of sex trafficking. This education
must be vivid and personal. The situations exposed must be relevant to the soldier’s
current occupation. Otherwise it will be close to impossible to effectively implement and
enforce recent changes that would prohibit the solicitation of prostitutes under the MCM.
¶55
The issue of civilian contractors poses a potentially even larger hurdle as the
regulations related to contractors are weak or altogether nonexistent. Civilian contractors
continue to make up more and more of the U.S. workforce at military bases and the
military is becoming increasingly dependent upon their services. Currently, the MEJA is
insufficient to prohibit contractors from engaging in trafficking activities, and the laws
that are applicable are rarely enforced. The U.S. needs to implement aggressive policies
that will not only stop civilian contractors from engaging in trafficking activities, but will
also prohibit them from soliciting a prostitute which contributes to the demand for sexual
trafficking. Otherwise, sex trafficking will continue to flourish near military bases to
satisfy the demand for prostitutes from civilian contractors who face no threat of
discipline for their actions.
¶56
If the United States and the Department of Defense are committed to stopping the
spread of sexual trafficking near military bases, they will have to go beyond previous
efforts that have only begun to address this issue. Thus far, legal efforts to control both
soldiers and civilian contractors have been insufficient to stop the behavior that persists.
185
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Stronger legal initiative must be coupled with an overall change in military culture. The
alternative of issuing bold statements against trafficking without taking any real action
will allow the continued exploitation of women as slaves, destabilize regions already
hostile to U.S. occupation, and sabotage U.S. efforts to lead the world in the fight against
human trafficking.
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